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UNWRAPPING THE WRAPAROUND MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE PROCESS
A wraparound mortgage' is a special type of junior or second mort-
gage. 2 A wraparound is subordinate to an existing first mortgage or other
prior lien that remains unsa.isfied.3 The wraparound differs from a con-
ventional second mortgage in that the principal or face amount of the
wraparound "wraps around" and includes the underlying indebtedness of
the first mortgage.4 The face amount of the wraparound, therefore, consists
of the underlying indebtedness of the first mortgage and the amount of
the additional funds or credit that the lender extends under the wrapa-
round.s The lender charges interest, at a rate higher than that charged on
the underlying indebtedness, on the face amount of the wraparound to
create a yield greater than the yield that an ordinary junior mortgage
would produce. 6 When the lender adds the amount of underlying indebt-
edness to the amount of funds extended under the wraparound and charges
interest on the resulting sum, the lender collects sufficient payments to
service the underlying debt.7 The most distinctive feature of the wrap-
1. Commentators and practitioners do not agree on the spelling ("wraparound," "wrap
around," or "wrap-around") or name ("wraparound," "all-inclusive," "overriding" mortgage
or deed of trust) of this financing device. See Galowitz, How to Use Wraparound Financing,
5 REAL Est. L.J. 107, 137 (1976) (noting that commentators and practitioners disagree on
spelling and name of wraparounds). This Note will refer to the terms "wraparound mortgage,"
"wraparound note," and "wraparound deed of trust" as a "wraparound."
2. See Bentley, The Wrap-Around Mortgage: Analyzing and Documenting, Advanced
Real Estate Law Course Materials X-3 (1986) (available from State Bar of Texas) (explaining
that wraparounds are essentially junior mortgages); Gunning, The Wrap-Around Mortgage
... Friend or U.F.O.?, 2 REAL EST. Rnv. 35, 36 (1972) (stating that wraparounds are second
mortgages); Zumpano & Marsh, Creative Financing Arrangements: Risks and Liabilities, 12
REA EST. L.J. 151, 156 (1983) (noting that wraparounds are subordinate mortgages because
wraparounds "wrap around" existing indebtedness); infra note 4 and accompanying text
(describing difference between wraparound and conventional second mortgage). But see HAw.
REv. STAT. § 478.8(e)(1) (1985) (defining wraparounds as first liens for purposes of usury
statute).
3. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-1 (stating that first mortgage and other prior liens
remain outstanding at inception of wraparound); Gunning, supra note 2, at 36 (same).
4. See Gunning, supra note 2, at 36 (comparing wraparound financing to conventional
mortgage financing).
5. See id. (explaining mechanics of wraparounds).
6. See id. (describing mechanics of wraparounds).
7. See R. KRATOV]m & R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 378 (9th ed. 1988) (explaining
that, because wraparound mortgagee charges interest on aggregated debts, wraparound mort-
gagee collects payments sufficient to pay prior mortgage); Bentley, supra note 2, at X-1
(explaining that wraparound mortgagee uses payments received from wraparound mortgagor
to pay underlying debt); infra notes 16-26 and accompanying text (illustrating that, although
wraparound mortgagor does not assume first mortgage indebtedness, wraparound mortgagee
includes first mortgage debt in wraparound debt and services underlying debt by charging
interest on sum of underlying indebtedness and funds advanced under wraparound).
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around is that the lender, the wraparound mortgagee, and the borrower,
the wraparound mortgagor, typically agree that the wraparound mortgagee
will pay the underlying indebtedness from the funds received from the
wraparound mortgagor. 8 The parties to the wraparound also usually agree
that the wraparound mortgagor will take the property "subject to" the
underlying indebtedness and, therefore, not assume liability for the un-
derlying indebtedness. 9
The two principal types of wraparounds are the purchase money
wraparound and the refinancing wraparound.' 0 The purchase money wrap-
around facilitates the purchase of real property." The parties to a sale of
real property use a purchase money wraparound when interest rates are
higher at the time of sale than the interest rate of the underlying mortgage
on the property.' 2 Because the buyer may not wish to or cannot obtain
financing at the prevailing market interest rate, the seller provides the
buyer with the financing for the transaction."' In return for financing the
transaction, the seller receives a promissory note and either a deed of trust
or a purchase money mortgage from the buyer. 14 By providing the buyer
8. See Baggett, Foreclosure: Special Problem Areas, Twentieth Annual Mortgage Lend-
ing Institute 3 (1986) (available from University of Texas Law Library) (describing and
illustrating common express agreements found in wraparounds); Bentley, supra note 2, at X-
15 (same); Gunning, supra note 2, at 37 (describing common express agreements between
wraparound mortgagor and wraparound mortgagee); Comment, The Wrap-Around Mortgage:
A Critical Inquiry, 21 UCLA L. REv. 1529, 1529-30 (1974) [hereinafter Comment, Critical
Inquiry] (discussing characteristics of wraparound agreements).
9. See Gunning, supra note 2, at 37 (noting that wraparound borrower expressly agrees
not to assume payment of underlying indebtedness).
10. See Hool v. Rydholm, 467 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing
purchase money and refinancing wraparounds as two categories of wraparounds); Note, Wrap-
Around Financing: A Technique for Skirting the Usury Laws? 1972 DuxE L.J. 785, 789
[hereinafter Note, Wrap-Around Financing] (identifying purchase money and refinancing
wraparounds as two types of wraparounds); Note, The Wrap-Around Deed of Trust: An
Answer to the Allegation of Usury, 10 PAc. L.J. 923, 927-29 (1979) [hereinafter Note, The
Wrap-Around Deed of Trust] (same); Comment, Critical Inquiry, supra note 8, at 1530 (same).
The purchase money wraparound and the refinancing wraparound may encompass more than
one prior lien. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-2 (noting that parties may wrap around
outstanding obligations, including other wraparounds). In cases in which more that one
wraparound exists, each subsequent wraparound becomes a lower priority lien to all previous
mortgages. Id.
11. See Comment, Critical Inquiry, supra note 8, at 1531 (explaining that purchase
money wraparound is taken in exchange for conveyance of land).
12. See Gunning, supra note 2, at 36 (explaining use of purchase money wraparounds).
13. See id. (discussing circumstances in which seller provides wraparound financing to
buyer).
14. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-6 (describing instruments that parties use in wrapa-
round transactions); Note, The Wrap-Around Deed of Trust, supra note 10, at 927 (explaining
that borrower signs promissory note, which acknowledges debt and promises payment, in
addition to executing deed of trust or mortgage that serves as security for repayment). Although
a mortgage and a deed of trust operate differently in the financing of the sale of property,
the differences are not important for the purposes of this Note. The arguments this Note
advances are equally applicable in jurisdictions that employ a trust deed rather than a mortgage
1026
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with purchase money wraparound financing, the seller capitalizes on both
the sale of the property and the low interest rate on the underlying
mortgage.'5
The following example illustrates a purchase money wraparound trans-
action. 16 Landowner (L) wants to sell his equity in Blackacre for $200,000.
L owes $50,000 on a first mortgage loan at an eight percent interest rate.
The prevailing market interest rate is twelve percent. Purchaser (P) is
unable to obtain institutional financing. L, as seller, will finance the
transaction by taking a wraparound from P for $250,000 at a ten percent
interest rate. The face amount of the wraparound ($250,000) includes the
underlying indebtedness ($50,000) plus the amount of the credit L extended
to P ($200,000). P delivers a wraparound to L. The wraparound includes
L's covenant to pay the first mortgage holder from the payments that L
receives from P. P's annual interest payment on the $250,000 note at ten
percent interest is $25,000. Thus, L could pay the $4,000 of annual interest
on the first mortgage and also realize interest income of $21,000.17
Unlike a purchase money wraparound, a refinancing wraparound does
not occur in conjunction with the sale of real property." The debtor,
instrument. For purposes of clarity, this Note assumes that a wraparound deed of trust is the
instrument that secures the wraparound promissory note.
15. See Prince George's County v. McMahon, 59 Md. App. 682, 686, 477 A.2d 1218,
1220 (1984) (explaining that, because wraparound interest rate is computed on sum of first
mortgage and any additional funds advanced, wraparound seller receives higher effective loan
rate); Bentley, supra note 2, at X-6 (explaining seller's advantages in wraparound transactions).
16. Examples throughout this Note assume simple interest.
17. The following computations illustrate the amortization of the purchase money wrap-
around example:
Existing first mortgage (underlying loan):
Original Amount of loan $100,000.00
Interest rate 8.00%
Term 20 years
Annual Debt Service (principal and interest) $ 12,370.44
Wraparound loan:
Amount of loan $250,000.00
Interest rate 10.00%
Term 10 years
Annual Debt Service (principal
and interest) $ 46,960.89
Net Return to seller:
Amount received from wraparound $ 46,960.89
Amount paid on first mortgage (12,370.44)
Net income to seller $ 34,590.45
Net return 17.30%
18. See Hool v. Rydholm, 467 So. 2d 1038, 1039-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (stating
that borrower and lender do not use refinancing wraparounds with sales of property). As with
a purchase money wraparound, a promissory note and a deed of trust or mortgage accompany
the refinancing wraparound. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-6 (identifying documents used in
refinancing wraparound transactions); Gunning, supra note 2, at 36 (explaining refinancing
wraparounds). Gunning lists four common situations in which parties employ refinancing
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instead, wants to borrow an amount equal to his equity in a piece of
property. 19 The debtor signs a note equal to the amount of the funds that
the lender advances plus the amount of the underlying debt on the
property. 0 The refinancing loan thus "wraps around" the prior debts,
and the lender receives a junior lien that is subordinate to any prior
mortgages on the property.21 Although the lender advances only the
difference between the face amount of the wraparound and the unpaid
balance of the underlying debt, the borrower must pay interest on the full
face amount of the wraparound, which includes the senior indebtedness.
2 2
In a refinancing transaction the lender, not the borrower, takes advantage
of the lower interest rate on the senior debt.
23
Using the parties discussed in the previous example, the following
example explains a refinancing wraparound. L owns Whiteacre subject to
a $100,000 first mortgage bearing an eight percent interest rate. Whiteacre's
fair market value is $300,000. To obtain a $100,000 personal loan, L
wants to refinance Whiteacre by securing the loan on his equity. A third
party wraparound lender (TP) will advance L $100,000 if L gives TP a
wraparound in the amount of $200,000 (underlying indebtedness of $100,000
plus the advance of $100,000) at ten percent interest. 24 L pays TP $20,000
interest per year ($200,000 face amount of wraparound at ten percent
interest), and TP in turn agrees to pay the first mortgagee $8,000 interest
per year ($100,000 first mortgage balance at eight per cent interest).
Although TP agrees to pay off the first mortgage, TP does not assume
the obligation on the first mortgage. 25 Thus, TP takes advantage of L's
wraparounds: first, when the mortgagor desires additional financing but the mortgagee refuses
to provide the refinancing or the cost of conventional secondary financing is prohibitive;
second, when the mortgagor desires additional financing and the first mortgage prohibits
prepayment or charges a substantial penalty for prepayment; third, when the existing first
mortgage is satisfactory in amount but the mortgagor desires to obtain debt-service relief to
improve his return on equity; and fourth, when a commitment for permanent financing is
inadequate and conventional secondary financing is too expensive or burdensome. Id.
19. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-4 (describing debtor's objectives in refinancing
wraparound transactions).
20. See id. (explaining mechanics of refinancing wraparounds); Note, Wrap-Around
Financing, supra note 10, at 787 (same); Note, The Wrap-Around Deed of Trust, supra note
10, at 929 (same).
21. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-4 (explaining mechanics of refinancing wraparounds).
22. See id. (describing borrower's obligation in refinancing wraparound transaction).
23. See id. at X-5 (explaining how lender benefits in refinancing wraparound transactions
because of lower interest rate on first mortgage); cf. supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text
(illustrating borrower's advantageous use of lower interest rate on first mortgage).
24. See The Wrap-Around Deed of Trust, supra note 10, at 929 n.10 (explaining
refinancing wraparounds). If the refinancing wraparound borrower borrows additional funds
from the same lender that holds the first mortgage or deed of trust on the property, then the
transaction is viewed as a rescission of the old contract and the formation of a new contract
as a first mortgage or deed of trust. See id. (explaining effect of using same lender who holds
first mortgage or deed of trust to refinance property).
25. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-4 to X-5 (explaining that refinancing wraparound
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lower interest rate on the first mortgage, $100,000 at eight percent, by
receiving debt service payments on $200,000 at ten percent interest. Al-
though TP must pay $8,000 interest to the first mortgage holder, TP
receives $20,000 per year from L, and TP thus realizes $12,000 of interest
income per year on the $100,000 advanced to L. 26
By engaging in a wraparound transaction, a lender can protect his
inferior lien position by monitoring the borrower's performance on the
underlying loans, can profit from the difference in interest between the
lender and wraparound borrower agree that wraparound lender will pay on first mortgage but
that wraparound lender does not assume first mortgage obligation); Gunning, supra note 2,
at 37 (same); Randolph, Home Finance in the Shadow World: Unsolved Usury Problems
Affecting Adjustable Rate and Wraparound Mortgages in Missouri, 51 UMKC L. Rnv. 41,
65 (noting that refinancing wraparound lender usually agrees to make payments on first
mortgage as payments fall due and as refinancing wraparound lender receives payments from
the wraparound borrower). Gunning notes that some wraparound documents contain language
tantamount to an assumption of the first mortgage by the refinancing wraparound lender. See
Gunning, supra note 2, at 37 (explaining refinancing wraparounds). According to Gunning,
however, wraparound documents can and do dispell the legal effects of an assumption because
the documents condition the wraparound lender's obligation to pay the first mortgage holder
on the wraparound lender's actual receipt of the debt service on the refinancing wraparound
from the wraparound borrower. See id. (same).
26. The following computations illustrate amortization of the refinancing wraparound
example:
Existing first mortgage (underlying loan):
Original Amount of loan $100,000.00
Interest rate 8.0007
Term 20 years
Annual Debt Service (principal and interest) $ 12,370.44
Wraparound loan:
Amount of loan $200,000.00
Interest rate 10.00%
Term 10 years
Annual Debt Service (principal and interest) $ 38,823.62
Net Loan Amount:
Amount of Wraparound $200,000.00
Outstanding balance on first mortgage ($100,000.00)
Amount Advanced $100,000.00
Net Return to lender on Wraparound:
Amount Advanced $100,000.00
Term 10 years
Annual Debt Service (principal and interest) received $ 38,823.62
Annual Debt Service (principal
and interest) paid ($ 12,370.44)
Net Income $ 26,453.18
Net return 26.45%
The lender increases the interest yield by advancing only $100,000 but receiving interest
calculated on the face amount of the wraparound ($200,000). Many possible variations in the
structure of wraparound transactions exist. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-39 (explaining that
wraparound may be "interest only" for several years, while senior debt amortizes principal;
that wraparound may contain periodic "mini-balloon" payments to correspond to underlying
balloon payments; and that wraparound may cover underlying payments by charging lower
interest rate on sufficiently higher face amount).
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wraparound and the underlying indebtedness, can realize a continuously
increasing equity interest in the property, and possibly can defer taxes by
treating the wraparound transaction as an installment sale. 27 Disadvantages
include excessive paperwork involved with servicing the debt obligations
underlying a wraparound, the usury implications from the profits of any
interest spread on a wraparound, 28 and a "procedural quagmire ' ' 29 upon
the foreclosure of a wraparound. 0
The advantages of a wraparound transaction for the wraparound
borrower include the convenience of paying interest on one note instead
of two, the securing of financing that otherwise might not be available to
the borrower, the appeal of a low interest rate on the underlying indebt-
edness, and an overall interest rate at less than the market rate of interest.3'
The wraparound purchaser, however, may encounter a wraparound mort-
gagee who defaults on the underlying indebtedness without informing the
purchaser of the default, who does not allow the purchaser to deal with
prior lienholders, and who charges a high interest rate on the wraparound
that offsets the low interest rate on the underlying indebtedness. 2
27. See Investors Funding Corp. v. Bloor, 547 F.2d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining
how lender benefits from wraparound financing and noting that, because monthly rate of
amortization is faster on first mortgage than on wraparound, lender receives continually
increasing equity interest in property); Levin v. Garfinkle, 499 F.Supp. 1344, 1350 (E.D. Pa.
1980), aff'd 667 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining that wraparound holder controls debt
service on property because borrower makes payments reflecting entire indebtedness of property
directly to wraparound holder and wraparound holder in turn pays senior lienholders); Prince
George's County v. McMahon, 59 Md. App. 682, 687, 477 A.2d 1218, 1220 (1984) (explaining
that wraparound lender expects to obtain best effective yield with least amount of cash
investment because interest on wraparound is computed on sum of first mortgage and any
additional funds advanced); Bentley, supra note 2, at X-2 (explaining advantages to lenders
of wraparound financing).
28. See infra notes 103-44 and accompanying text (discussing usury implications of
wraparounds). The difference between the face amount of the wraparound and the accompa-
nying interest rate and the underlying indebtedness and the accompanying interest rate is
referred to as the spread. See Randolph, supra note 25, at 66 n.99 (defining spread as difference
between underlying indebtedness and face amount of wraparound); Waters, What It's Like
To Be A Junior Lienholder, Eleventh Annual Advanced Real Estate Law Course D-17 to D-
18 (available from State Bar of Texas) (defining spread as difference between amount wrap-
around lender actually advances and face amount of wraparound).
29. See Bayshore Garden Apartments, Ltd. v. Real Estate Apartments, Ltd., 541 So. 2d
158, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (noting that foreclosure of wraparounds is "procedural
quagmire").
30. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-2 (describing disadvantages of wraparounds that
lenders encounter).
31. See id. at X-3 (explaining advantages of wraparound transactions for borrowers);
Gunning, supra note 2, at 36 (same); Department of Revenue v. Brookwood Assocs., 324 So.
2d 184, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (explaining that wraparound enables borrower to make
single payments on property's total indebtedness because lender transmits amount due under
first mortgage to first mortgage holder).
32. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-3 (noting disadvantages to wraparound borrowers
of wraparound transactions). See generally Stroh-Mc Invs. v. Bowens, 725 P.2d 33, 34 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1986) (involving wraparound mortgagee who defaulted on underlying indebtedness
and failed to inform wraparound borrower of default).
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Commentators have addressed the implications of wraparound financ-
ing in relation to usury claims, due-on-sale clauses, and taxes.33 One
subject that is "fraught with questions and uncertainty ' 34 is the foreclosure
of wraparounds. Courts generally have failed to consider the foreclosure
of wraparounds.35 How courts will compute the debt on a wraparound is
the all-important issue in wraparound foreclosures because other significant
wraparound foreclosure issues, such as usury and the application of excess
foreclosure proceeds, depend upon computation of debt.1
6
Until recently, the topic of wraparound foreclosures received sparse
judicial attention.3 7 In Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust,
3
however, the Texas Supreme Court adopted a method to compute whether
a deficiency or a surplus exists after the foreclosure of a wraparound.
3 9
In Summers English Village Apartments (EVA) sold property to Robert
Sill (Sill) in return for a purchase money wraparound. 40 The underlying
indebtedness totaled $3,250,000.41 EVA extended $1,450,000 in credit to
33. See generally Comment, Critical Inquiry, supra note 8 (discussing wraparounds in
context of usury, due-on-sale clauses, and taxes); Note, Wrap-around Financing, supra note
10 (discussing usury implication of wraparounds); Hershman, Usury and "New Look" in Real
Estate Financing, 4 REA PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 315 (1969) (same); Note, The Wrap-Around
Deed of Trust, supra note 10 (same); Schwarz, The Wrap-Around Mortgage: Cold Comfort
in the Winter of the Due-On-Sale Clause, 4 ANN. REV. BANIo L. 429 (1985) (discussing
wraparounds in context of due-on-sale clauses); Kanter & Banoff, Should Real Estate Be Sold
Via Wrap-Around Mortgages?, 70 J. TAx'N 255 (1989) (discussing tax implications of wra-
parounds); Fowler & Wyndelts, Installment Sales: Wraparound Mortgage Regulation Invali-
dated by the Tax Court, 15 J. REAL ESTATE TAx'N 203 (1988) (same).
34. See Quality Inns Int'l. v. Booth, 292 S.E.2d 755, 762 (N.C. App. 1982) (describing
wraparound foreclosures as "fraught with uncertainty").
35. But see infra note 37 (listing few courts that have addressed wraparound foreclosures).
36. Compare Consolidated Capital Special Trust v. Summers, 737 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (using true debt method to compute wraparound debt) with Summers v. Consoli-
dated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W. 2d 580 (Tex. 1989) (adopting outstanding balance method
to compute wraparound debt); compare Lee v. O'Leary, 742 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(using true debt method to compute wraparound debt) with Lee v. Key West Towers, Inc.,
783 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1989) (adopting outstanding balance method of wraparound debt
computation).
37. See FPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E & G Invs., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 1023, 255 Cal. Rptr.
157, 160 (1989) (noting that proper method of foreclosure of wraparounds is unclear); Armsey
v. Channel Assocs., 184 Cal. App. 3d 833, 838, 229 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (1986) (stating that
proper method of wraparound foreclosure is unclear and that foreclosure is most difficult
problem of wraparounds); Bayshore Garden Apartments, Ltd. v. Real Estate Apartments,
Ltd., 541 So. 2d 158, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that no statute or judicial
rule addresses proper manner of foreclosing wraparounds); J.M. Realty Inv. Corp. v. Stem,
296 So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (interpreting terms of wraparound to hold
defaulting mortgagor liable for face amount of wraparound mortgage); infra note 79 (discussing
J.M. Realty).
38. 783 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1989).
39. Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. 1989).
40. Id. at 581.
41. Id. In Summers the underlying indebtedness that the Sill note wrapped around
consisted of four prior liens. Id.; see infra note 54 (listing four prior liens in Summers).
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Sill, causing the face amount of the wraparound to equal $4,700,000.42
The Sill wraparound executed in favor of EVA was made subordinate to
all prior liens. 43 Sill later used a refinancing wraparound to obtain addi-
tional funds from Consolidated Capital Special Trust (Consolidated).44 Sill
executed a wraparound in favor of Consolidated bearing a face amount
of $6,289,000. 4 - Consolidated was a subordinate lienholder to EVA because
Consolidated's wraparound was subsequent to EVA's wraparound.
4 6
Sill defaulted on the Consolidated wraparound.4 7 Six months later,
Consolidated foreclosed on the wraparound and acquired the property
that EVA had sold to Sill.4s When the Sill debt to EVA became due,
Consolidated, as Sill's assignee, failed to pay; consequently, Summers, the
trustee named in the Sill wraparound to EVA, initiated foreclosure pro-
ceedings. 49 At the foreclosure sale, EVA acquired the property with a
$2,750,000 credit bid.50 Consolidated subsequently sued EVA, claiming
that EVA's bid of $2,750,000 exceeded Consolidated's debt to EVA and
that EVA, therefore, owed Consolidated the surplus of EVA's bid minus
Consolidated's debt to EVA.5 1 The trial court rejected Consolidated's
argument, found that a deficiency existed after the foreclosure sale, and
granted EVA's motion for summary judgment.5 2
On Consolidated's appeal the Texas Court of Appeals determined that
the language of the Sill wraparound required that the trustee apply the
proceeds from the foreclosure sale to the indebtedness secured by the Sill
42. Summers, 783 S.W.2d at 581.
43. Id.
44. Id. Although Sill used a refinancing wraparound to obtain additional funds from
Consolidated, the wraparound at issue was Sill's purchase money wraparound to EVA. Id.
45. Id.
46. See generally supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing lien priority of
wraparounds when more than one wraparound exists).
47. Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Tex. 1989).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. In Summers the trustee credited EVA's bid of $2,750,000 against the amount
owed on the Sill note. Id. In other words, EVA did not pay any cash money for the property
at the foreclosure sale because EVA used a "credit bid" to purchase the property. See generally
Armsey v. Channel Assocs., 184 Cal. App. 3d 833, 834, 229 Cal. Rptr. 509, 511 (1986)
(explaining that full credit bid operates as total satisfaction of lien); Thomason v. Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 74 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex. Ct. App. 1934) (explaining that mortgagee may bid
and purchase property at foreclosure sale and apply proceeds as credit against mortgagor's
debt to mortgagee); R. KRATov & R. WERNER, supra note 7, at 395 (explaining that mortgagee
is allowed to bid up to amount of mortgage debt without producing cash because purpose of
foreclosure sale is to raise money to pay mortgagee).
51. See Summers, 783 S.W.2d at 581 (discussing Consolidated's claim against EVA).
52. See id. at 582 (stating that trial court denied Consolidated's claim and granted EVA's
motion for summary judgment); see also Hodges v. Star Lumber & Hardware Co., 544 S.W.2d
185, 185-86 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (explaining that deficiency exists when foreclosure sale
proceeds are less than amount that mortgagor owes foreclosing mortgagee); R. KRATovEL &
R. WERNER, supra note 7, at 390 (same); C. JACOBUS, REAL ESTATE LAW 215 (1986) (same).
1032
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wraparound and to pay the balance, if any, to the owner of the property.
53
The court of appeals emphasized that the notice of the foreclosure sale
and the trustee's deed to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale stated that
the property would be sold "subject to" the senior liens described in the
Sill wraparound.5 4 By construing the foreclosure sale as "subject to" the
senior liens, the court excluded the senior liens from the debt "secured
by" the Sill wraparound.55 The court of appeals, consequently, held that
the trustee should credit the foreclosure sale proceeds against that portion
of the wraparound which exceeded the underlying indebtedness.5 6 The
court instructed the trustee to pay any sums that remained after this credit
to the debtor, Consolidated. 7 Accordingly, the court of appeals granted
53. Summers, 783 S.W.2d at 581. In Summers the pertinent provision of the Sill deed
of trust read:
[T]he Trustee shall first pay all expenses .... and shall next apply such proceeds
toward the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby (principal, interest [and]
attorney's fees, if any), the remaining balance, if any, shall be paid to Grantors
[Sill], their heirs and assigns [Consolidated].
Id. (emphasis in original).
54. Consolidated, 737 S.W.2d at 329. The priority of the liens encumbering the property
were:
Lien Mortgagee Original Principal Sum Due
I John Hancock $ 2,450,000 6/01/98
2 Gaslight Square 2,775,000 10/25/89
(Wrapped Lien 1)
3 Manchester Group 3,250,000 8/15/89
(Wrapped Liens 1
and 2)
4 RAIA 500,000 10/01/83
5 EVA 4,700,000 10/01/83
Id.
55. See Consolidated Capital Special Trust v. Summers, 737 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (noting that EVA purchased property at foreclosure sale expressly subject to prior
liens described in wraparound). The Consolidated court reasoned that, because EVA and Sill
used "subject to" to indicate that all prior liens would encumber the property if the property
were sold, EVA and Sill must not have intended to include the prior liens in the computation
of debt secured by the deed of trust. Id. at 331-32. See Daugharthy v. Monritt Assocs., 444
A.2d 1030, 1032-33 (Md. App. 1982) (explaining that sale of property "subject to" existing
mortgage does not make purchaser responsible for payment of existing mortgage); C. JAcoBus,
supra note 52, at 226 (explaining that sale of property "subject to" prior liens does not
personally obligate purchaser to pay existing mortgage).
56. Consolidated, 737 S.W.2d at 332.
57. Id. The court of appeals in Consolidated illustrated the debt computation as follows:
TOTAL DEBT (principal, interest and fees) OF FIFTH LIEN
(wraps first four liens) $ 6,206,952
AMOUNT OF "PRIOR LIENS DEBT" (to which foreclosure was subject)
-Third lien (wraps first two liens) $ 3,017,581
-RAIA note (fourth lien) 976,685
(3,994,266)
AMOUNT OWED TO EVA ON 2,212,686
AMOUNT BID AT FORECLOSURE 2,750,000
LESS AMOUNT OWED (2,212,686)
EXCESS PROCEEDS 537,314
Id. at 330.
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summary judgment for Consolidated.5 8
By requiring the trustee to credit the foreclosure sale proceeds against
the difference between the underlying indebtedness and the face amount
of the Sill wraparound, the Texas Court of Appeals adopted the true debt
method of debt computation.5 9 The true debt method of debt computation
focuses on the amount of funds the wraparound lender actually advances
to the wraparound mortgagor and ignores the face amount stated in the
wraparound. 60 Proponents of the true debt method argue that the true
debt method considers the economic reality and substance of a wraparound
transaction rather than the rigid form of the transaction. 61 One commen-
tator asserts that the economic reality of a wraparound transaction is that
the wraparound lender will disburse to the wraparound borrower the full
face amount of the wraparound only when the wraparound borrower
defaults on the first interest payment and the wraparound lender elects
immediately to pay off the first mortgage. 62 The true debt method further
posits that the wraparound mortgagor is not responsible for any underlying
indebtedness included in the wraparound because the wraparound mort-
gagor does not accept responsibility for any underlying indebtedness when
the mortgagor purchases the property. 63 The underlying indebtedness,
instead, remains the responsibility of the wraparound mortgagee. 4 Under
the true debt method the wraparound mortgagor is liable only for the
actual amount of funds that the wraparound mortgagee advances.
65
58. Id.
59. See Consolidated Capital Special Trust v. Summers, 737 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (adopting, implicitly, true debt method of debt computation).
60. See Goren & Meyer, Foreclosing the Wraparound Mortgage: Practical Considerations
and the Emergence of Texas Case Law, 1988 Tax. B.J. 1051, 1052 (Nov.) (defining true debt
as difference between balance of wraparound and balance of underlying indebtedness); Gunning,
supra note 2, at 37, 45 (stating that true measure of debt secured by wraparound is net
investment of wraparound lender and that net investment is difference between balance of
wraparound and balance of underlying indebtedness). Gunning terms the true debt as the
wraparound mortgagee's net investment. Id. at 37. Gunning also suggests that the face amount
of the wraparound is irrelevant in determining the amount of indebtedness secured by the
wraparound. Id. at 45. Gunning argues that the face amount of the wraparound is relevant
only in computing the wraparound lender's effective rate of interest. Id.
61. See Goren & Meyer, supra note 60, at 1052 (discussing true debt method for
calculating deficiency or surplus after foreclosure of wraparound).
62. See Gunning, supra note 2, at 45 (explaining that only if wraparound lender pays
off first mortgage does wraparound lender actually advance face amount of wraparound to
wraparound borrower); Bentley, supra note 2, at X-1 1, X-60 (noting that many attorneys view
wraparound balance as wraparound lender's equity in wraparound, that is, difference between
underlying indebtedness and face amount of wraparound). Bentley suggests that the face
amount of a wraparound should be relevant to the computation of wraparound debt when
the first mortgage holder accelerates the underlying debt or when the wraparound mortgagee
satisfies the underlying debt. Id.
63. See Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. 1989)





On Summers and EVA's appeal of the decision of the Texas Court
of Appeals, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether the appellate
court correctly used the true debt method. 66 Upon analyzing the true debt
method, the Summers court concluded that the true debt method provided
an unnecessary windfall to Consolidated for defaulting on the EVA wrap-
around because the foreclosure relieved Consolidated from any further
obligation to EVA 67 and awarded Consolidated more than $500,000 for
defaulting on the wraparound. 6 Dissatisfied with the consequences of
applying the true debt method, the Summers court analyzed the outstanding
balance method, which treats the unpaid balance of a wraparound as the
pertinent debt figure. 69 The Summers court distinguished the wraparound
mortgagor's personal liability on the underlying indebtedness from the
wraparound mortgagor's obligation to pay for the property, as the wrap-
around mortgagee and the wraparound mortgagor had agreed. 70 The Texas
Supreme Court reasoned that Consolidated's failure to become liable on
the underlying indebtedness did not affect Consolidated's obligation to
pay EVA the entire amount of the wraparound.
7'
The Summers court recognized that a wraparound mortgagee's failure
to apply excess proceeds from a foreclosure sale to the underlying debt
could result in a third party purchaser at a wraparound foreclosure sale
having to pay twice to obtain clear title to the property.72 The court
specifically determined that a third party purchaser would have to pay
cash at the foreclosure sale and then have to satisfy the underlying
indebtedness to obtain clear title to the property and avoid subsequent
foreclosure of the property.73 To avoid forcing a third party purchaser to
pay twice to obtain clear title to the property,74 the Summers court implied
a covenant, applicable to all wraparounds, that required that the trustee
apply any excess proceeds from a foreclosure to the underlying indebted-
ness. 71 If any proceeds remain after the trustee applies the proceeds to the
66. Id.
67. Id.; see supra note 50 (explaining that full credit bid operates to satisfy defaulting
mortgagor's obligation to mortgagee).
68. Summers, 783 S.W.2d at 582; see supra note 57 and accompanying text (illustrating
Texas Court of Appeals' computation of Consolidated's excess proceeds).
69. Summers, 783 S.W.2d at 582-83.
70. See id. at 582 (noting that court of appeals confused wraparound mortgagor's liability
on underlying indebtedness with wraparound mortgagor's obligation to pay face amount of
wraparound).
71. See id. (applying distinction between wraparound mortgagor's liability on underlying
indebtedness and wraparound mortgagor's obligation to pay wraparound).
72. Id. at 583.
73. See id. (recognizing that outstanding balance method may require third party pur-
chaser to pay senior liens twice to obtain clear title to property).
74. See infra notes 75, 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of third party
purchaser paying twice to obtain clear title if foreclosing wraparound mortgagee failed to
apply excess proceeds to underlying indebtedness).
75. Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex. 1989).
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underlying indebtedness, the court directed that the trustee distribute the
remaining funds to the defaulting mortgagor.7 6 The Summers court found
that the express terms of the agreement between Sill and EVA, to which
Consolidated, as Sill's assignee, was subject, stated that Consolidated was
liable upon foreclosure for the entire face amount of the wraparound. 77
Accordingly, the court ruled against Consolidated, holding that a defi-
ciency existed because the foreclosure sale proceeds, when credited against
the outstanding balance of the wraparound, were less than the amount
Consolidated owed EVA.
78
The Summers court declared that a covenant requiring the trustee to apply any excess foreclosure
sale proceeds to the underlying indebtedness would be implied in every wraparound agreement
in Texas. Id.
76. Id. If a deed of trust secures the wraparound, the trustee is responsible for conducting
the foreclosure sale and applying the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. See id. (instructing
trustee how to apply foreclosure sale proceeds).
77. Id. at 582.
78. Id.; see infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text (analyzing Texas Supreme Court's
adoption of outstanding balance method of debt computation in Summers). In a companion
case to Summers, Lee v. Key West Towers, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court again considered
how to apply the proceeds from the foreclosure sale of a wraparound. Lee v. Key West
Towers, 783 S.W.2d 586, 586 (Tex. 1989). Lee involved a complex series of wraparound
transactions. Lee v. O'Leary, 742 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Lee
v. Key West Towers, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1989). In Lee the last wraparound mortgagor,
Key West Towers, Inc. (Key West), sold the property to Northern Hospitality, Inc. (Northern).
Lee v. O'Leary, 742 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). Northern failed to make payments
to Key West, causing Key West to default on its wraparound to Lee. Id. Key West's default
caused a chain of defaults and ultimately the holder of the first mortgage foreclosed and
acquired the property for $700,000. Id. at 30-31. The face amount of Key West's wraparound
to Lee (the Lee wraparound) was $1,125,000. Id. at 30.
Lee sued Key West on the Lee wraparound. Id. at 31. The trial court used the true debt
method and awarded Lee a deficiency judgment of approximately $74,000. Id. The trial court
subtracted the unpaid balance on the underlying indebtedness, $974,382.12, from the unpaid
balance on the Lee wraparound, $1,038,495.86, to arrive at the true debt of $73,702.70. Id.
The court computed the figures as follows:
UNPAID BALANCE OF LEE WRAPAROUND $ 1,038,495.86
UNPAID BALANCE OF UNDERLYING INDEBTEDNESS (974,382.12)
AMOUNT OWED TO LEE 64,113.74
PLUS PRE-TRIAL INTEREST 9,588.96
TOTAL AMOUNT OWED TO LEE 73,702.70
Id. Lee argued that the amount bid at the foreclosure sale, instead of the unpaid balance of
the underlying indebtedness, was the correct figure to credit against the amount owed on the
wraparound. Id. Lee computed the following figures:
UNPAID BALANCE OF LEE WRAPAROUND $ 1,038,495.86
AMOUNT BID AT FORECLOSURE 700,000.00
AMOUNT OWED TO LEE 338,495.86
PLUS PRE TRIAL INTEREST 9,588.96
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE LEE 348,084.82
Id.
The court of appeals in Lee subtracted the balance due on the prior liens from the
balance due on the Lee wraparound because the Lee wraparound was made "subject to" the
prior debts and because Key West expressly did not assume responsibility for the underlying
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Although the Texas Supreme Court adopted the outstanding balance
method in Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust, the outstanding
balance method, when applied to wraparound foreclosures, is flawed.7 9
debts. Id. at 32. On appeal the Texas Supreme Court relied on Summers and held that the
court should credit the foreclosure bid against the outstanding balance of the note. Lee v. Key
West Towers, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. 1989), rev'g sub nom. Lee v. O'Leary, 742
S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals' decision and remanded the case for a determination of the deficiency. Id. According
to the second computation above, the deficiency is $348,084.82.
79. See Baggett, supra note 8, at 113 (criticizing outstanding balance method of debt
computation). The outstanding balance method is similar to the face amount version of the
loan amount theory used when testing a loan for usury. See infra notes 112-15 and accom-
panying text (discussing face amount version of loan amount theory). The alternative method
for computing the debt of a wraparound is the true debt method. See supra notes 53-65 and
accompanying text (explaining true debt method of debt computation).
The Third District Court of Appeals of Florida adopted the outstanding balance approach
in J.M. Realty Investment Corporation v. Stern, 296 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
In J.M. Realty the court considered whether the wraparound mortgagor's default entitled the
wraparound mortgagee to foreclose on the entire balance due under the wraparound, including
the amount due on the first mortgage. J.M. Realty, 296 So. 2d at 589. The defendant, J.M.
Realty, purchased property for $220,000, paying $35,000 cash and executing a purchase money
wraparound in favor of Stern for $181,954, which included $150,000 of underlying indebtedness.
Id. at 588. The J.M. Realty court explained that, although the purchase price ($220,000) minus
the cash down payment ($35,000) equalled $185,000, credits for prepaid rents, security deposits,
and taxes amounted to $3,046.23. Id. n.1. The court thus determined that the wraparound
amount was $181,953.77 ($185,000 - $3,046.23). Id. at 588. After J.M. Realty defaulted on
the wraparound, Stem foreclosed on the wraparound. Id. at 589. The trial court determined
that J.M. Realty owed $185,851 on the wraparound. Id. The amount that J.M. Realty owed
Stern upon foreclosure was greater than the stated wraparound amount because the amount
foreclosed upon included accrued interest, court costs, and attorneys' fees. Id.
The trial court rejected J.M. Realty's arguments that the amount owed should not include
the principal on the first mortgage and that Stern, as a junior lienholder, could not accelerate
the junior mortgage without the senior lienholder's permission. Id. On appeal the district
court, without detailed analysis, concluded that the terms of the wraparound required J.M.
Realty to pay the face amount of the wraparound, not the difference between the balance on
the wraparound and the balance on the underlying indebtedness. Id. The district court,
consequently, affirmed the trial court's order which stated that the amount of wraparound
indebtedness included the underlying indebtedness. Id. The district court in J.M. Realty also
directed that the trustee at a foreclosure sale apply any proceeds received from a third party
purchaser first to the underlying indebtedness. Id.
The California appellate court adopted the reasoning of J.M. Realty in Armsey v. Channel
Associates, 184 Cal. App. 3d 833, 838-39, 229 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512-13 (1986). In Armsey the
court considered the methods of computing wraparound debt to determine whether an in-
debtedness remained after foreclosure. Id. at 835-36, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 510-11. Channel, the
defendant in Armsey, purchased property for $700,000, paying $100,000 cash and executing a
purchase money wraparound for $600,000. Id. at 835, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 510. After a fire
destroyed the improvements on the property, Channel defaulted on the wraparound. Id.
Armsey foreclosed and purchased the property with a credit bid of $456,562.73. Id. At the
time of foreclosure the balance of the wraparound totaled $621,000, which included $158,818.56
in underlying indebtedness. Id. After acquiring the property at the foreclosure sale, Armsey
filed a declaratory action to determine whether Armsey, the wraparound mortgagee, or Channel,
the wraparound mortgagor, was entitled to the fire insurance proceeds. Id.
Rejecting Channel's argument that the underlying indebtedness should be credited against
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For instance, under the outstanding balance method, a third party pur-
chaser at foreclosure must satisfy the underlying indebtedness twice to
obtain clear title to the property. First, the third party purchaser must
bid in excess of the credit available to the wraparound mortgagee. 80 The
third party purchaser who takes the property subject to the underlying
indebtedness then must satisfy the underlying indebtedness to avoid sub-
sequent foreclosure." Based on the Summers facts, a third party purchaser
would have to pay cash in excess of $10,000,000 to obtain clear title to
the property.
8 2
Foreclosing mortgagees usually purchase the property at foreclosure
by using a "credit bid," a non-cash bid that is credited against the
defaulting mortgagor's indebtedness to the mortgagee. 3 When a foreclo-
the unpaid balance of the wraparound, the court distinguished a wraparound mortgagee's
equity in property from a wraparound mortgagor's indebtedness on the property. Id. at 837-
38, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The court recognized that, if Armsey, the wraparound mortgagee,
sold the property for cash, Armsey would not retain the entire sale proceeds because of his
obligation to pay the senior liens. Id. If such a sale for cash took place, Armsey would realize
only the value of his equity, the difference between the balance of the wraparound and the
balance of the underlying indebtedness. See id. (explaining wraparound mortgagee's equity in
property); Comment, Critical Inquiry, supra note 8, at 1538 (recognizing that sale of encum-
bered property requires seller to use portion of sale proceeds to discharge liens encumbering
property and thus only realize value of seller's equity in property).
In contrast to the wraparound mortgagee's equity in property, the Armsey court deter-
mined that a wraparound lender receives a security interest in the full face amount of a
wraparound because the wraparound includes the deferred portion of the purchase price and
the unpaid balance of the underlying indebtedness. Armsey, 184 Cal. App. 3d at 837-38, 229
Cal. Rptr. at 512. The Armsey court concluded that a wraparound mortgagor's indebtedness
includes the total amount of the underlying liens, even though the wraparound mortgagee
remains obligated on the underlying liens and the wraparound mortgagor's obligation is only
to the wraparound mortgagee. Id. Embracing the reasoning of J.M. Realty, the court refused
to credit the underlying indebtedness to the unpaid balance of the wraparound, stating that
the court would not rewrite the parties' agreement. Id. at 839, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
80. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (explaining use and effect of wrap-
around mortgagee's credit bid on third party purchasers). Under the outstanding balance
method, the wraparound mortgagee can bid the entire balance of the wraparound as a credit
against the wraparound mortgagor's obligation to the wraparound mortgagee. See id. (same).
81. See Baggett, supra note 8, at 113 (explaining effect of outstanding balance on
third party who purchases property at foreclosure).
82. See supra note 57 (discussing wraparound and foreclosure bid figures in Summers).
On the facts of the Summers case, a third party purchaser would have to pay the outstanding
balance of the wraparound ($6,206,952) plus the underlying indebtedness of the senior liens
($3,994,266), an amount totaling $10,201,218. See Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special
Trust, 783 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Tex. 1989) (stating wraparound balance and underlying
indebtedness balance in Summers).
83. See Armsey v. Channel Assocs., 184 Cal. App. 3d 833, 836, 229 Cal. Rptr. 509,
511 (1986) (explaining that full credit bid is bid by lienholder at foreclosure in amount equal
to unpaid mortgage debt and that full credit bid operates as total satisfaction of obligation);
supra note 50 (explaining effect of mortgagee's credit bid); R. KRAToVIL & R. WERNER,
supra note 7, att 395 (stating that mortgagee is often only bidder at foreclosure and that
mortgagee is allowed to bid up to amount of mortgage debt without producing cash);
Bentley, supra note 8, at X-60 (stating that mortgage holder is usually successful bidder at
foreclosure sale); Goren & Meyer, supra note 60, at 1052 (same).
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sure sale only involves a defaulted junior lien, such as a wraparound, the
property is sold subject to the underlying or senior indebtedness.8 4 A
purchaser of property subject to an underlying indebtedness must make
payments on the prior existing indebtedness to avoid a subsequent fore-
closure even though the purchaser is not personally liable on the underlying
indebtedness.8 5 The outstanding balance method of debt computation,
consequently, negatively impacts potential purchasers, other than wrapa-
round mortgagees, who cannot use credit bids at wraparound foreclosure
sales.86 To lessen this negative impact, courts should limit the wraparound
mortgagee's credit bid to the difference between the wraparound balance
and the underlying indebtedness and require that the wraparound mort-
gagee pay cash for any bid exceeding that difference.
7
If the wraparound mortgagee bids an amount in excess of the differ-
ence between the underlying indebtedness balance and the wraparound
balance, the law pertaining to junior lien foreclosures supports a cash bid
requirement. After the foreclosure of a wraparound, a type of junior lien,
the prior senior liens still encumber the property. 8 Although a wraparound
mortgagee who bids at a foreclosure sale is not adversely affected by any
remaining senior liens because the mortgagee remains obligated on the
senior liens, a third party purchaser is disadvantaged because the third
party purchaser receives property that is encumbered by those liens.89 To
avoid disadvantaging third party purchasers, third party purchasers should
be able to calculate bids in light of any unpaid underlying indebtedness. 90
84. See C. JACOBUS, supra note 52, at 216 (stating that, in foreclosure sale of junior
lien, property is sold subject to superior interests).
85. See id. at 226 (explaining effect of taking property subject to superior interests).
86. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (illustrating effect of outstanding balance
method on purchasers who cannot use credit bids).
87. See Baggett, supra note 8, at 114 (suggesting that, if wraparound foreclosure sale
is subject to underlying indebtedness, wraparound mortgagee should have to pay cash for
any bid greater than difference between balance of wraparound and balance of underlying
obligation); Becker & Bingham, Current Issues in Foreclosures, Advanced Real Estate Law
Course H-35 (1987) (available from State Bar of Texas) (same); Gaiowitz, supra note 1, at
127 (same).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Sage, 566 F.2d 1114, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating
that foreclosure of junior lien does not affect pre-existing senior liens); Summers v.
Consolidated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W.2d 580, 585 (Tex. 1989) (Mauzy, J., dissenting)
(noting that foreclosure of senior lien extinguishes all inferior liens but does not affect any
more senior liens); Baggett, supra note 8, at 114 (stating that foreclosure of inferior mortgage
should not affect prior mortgage); Waters, supra note 28, at D-7 (concluding that foreclosure
of junior lien transfers title subject to senior liens).
89. See Baggett, supra note 8, at 113 (criticizing chilling effect of outstanding balance
method on participation of third party purchasers at foreclosure sales); supra notes 80-86
and accompanying text (suggesting that outstanding balance method requires third party
purchaser to pay twice to obtain clear title to property).
90. See Baggett, supra note 8, at 114 (suggesting that "best solution" to bid compu-
tation issue is to restrict wraparound mortgagee's credit bid to difference between wraparound
balance and underlying indebtedness balance and to allow third party purchaser to calculate
bid in light of underlying indebtedness).
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In other words, third-party purchasers would calculate bids by subtracting
the underlying indebtedness on the property from the fair market value
of the property.9 1
In addition to the outstanding balance method's adverse effect on
third party bidders at foreclosure sales, the wraparound documents may
not support the application of the outstanding balance method. For
example, the Summers court, in applying the outstanding balance method,
reasoned that the clear terms of the wraparound expressed the intent of
the parties that Consolidated was obligated to pay the full balance of the
wraparound. 92 The Sill wraparound in favor of EVA that Sill assigned to
Consolidated, however, contained additional language that suggested that
Sill and EVA intended the indebtedness to be the difference between the
wraparound balance and the balance of the underlying indebtedness. 93 The
provisions in the wraparound documents, stating that Consolidated as-
sumed no liability to pay the underlying indebtedness and that Consoli-
dated took the property subject to the underlying indebtedness, indicate
that the trustee should credit the underlying indebtedness against the
unpaid balance of the wraparound.
94
Yet another flaw of the outstanding balance method is its potential
to provide a windfall to a wraparound mortgagee.95 The outstanding
balance method allows the wraparound mortgagee to regain title to the
property and sue the wraparound mortgagor for any deficiency, or trans-
91. Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W.2d 580, 585 (Tex. 1989)
(Mauzy, J., dissenting). Justice Mauzy, in his dissenting opinion in Summers, suggested an
approach that allows third party purchasers to calculate bids by subtracting the amount
owed on the underlying indebtedness from the fair market value of the property. Id. Justice
Mauzy argued that such an approach is consistent with the intentions of the parties expressed
in the Summers deed of trust, which required the trustee to conduct the foreclosure sale
subject to the underlying indebtedness and excluded the wraparound mortgagor from personal
liability on the underlying indebtedness. Id.
92. See id. at 582 (discussing Consolidated's obligation to pay pursuant to express
terms of wraparound). The wraparound in Summers referred to the original principal balance
of $4,700,000 plus accrued interest as the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust. Id. at
581.
93. Id. at 582 n.2. The deed of trust in Summers provided:
The Grantors have accepted the conveyance of the ... property subject to the
Prior Notes and to the Prior Liens, to the extent and only to the extent set forth
in the Deed, and Grantors have in no way assumed or agreed to pay or to become
personally liable for any of the indebtedness evidenced by the Prior Notes.
Id. (emphasis added).
94. See id. at 585-86 (Mauzy, J., dissenting) (arguing that, because Note, Deed of
Trust, and Notice of Trustee's Sale in Summers contained express provisions that wraparound
mortgagor assumed no liability to pay underlying debt and that purchase was subject to the
underlying indebtedness, indebtedness secured by deed of trust did not include underlying
indebtedness). But see supra, notes 70-77 and accompanying text (explaining that Summers
majority viewed wraparound documents as clearly stating amount of indebtedness and
distinguishing between mortgagee's equity in property and mortgagor's obligation to pay
for property according to terms of wraparound).
95. See Goren & Meyer, supra note 60, at 1052 (criticizing outstanding balance method).
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form the mortgagee's equity in the property into cash. 96 According to
some commentators, the wraparound mortgagee thus benefits more when
a wraparound mortgagor defaults than when the wraparound mortgagor
fully performs under the wraparound. 97 The typical mortgagor certainly
will not intend that the mortgagee benefits when the mortgagor defaults.98
In addition to determining how to avoid claims of generating surplus
proceeds, such as Consolidated's claim against EVA in Summers, wrapa-
round mortgagees contemplating foreclosure of a wraparound mortgage
should consider three possible effects of a foreclosure. 99 First, the fore-
closing mortgagee should consider the possible usurious nature of accel-
erating the maturity of a wraparound.2°° Second, the foreclosing mortgagee
96. See id. (same).
97. See id. (same). An amicus curiae brief to Lee v. O'Leary, 742 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987) proposes that a wraparound mortgagee realizes a larger gain when the
wraparound mortgagor defaults under the outstanding balance approach. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae First American Title Insurance Company, Lee v. O'Leary, 742 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987) (No. 07-85-0350-CV). The amicus brief offers the following example: Assume
P, the wraparound mortgagor, acquired property by executing a wraparound of $4,500,000
in favor of L, the wraparound mortgagee. Brief of Amicus Curiae First American Title
Insurance Company at 4, Lee v. O'Leary, 742 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (No. 07-85-
0350-CV). The wraparound includes underlying indebtedness of $4,350,000 and L advances
$150,000 in credit to P. Id. P defaults on the wraparound and L forecloses. Id. at 5. At
the foreclosure sale L acquires the property with a $50,000 credit bid. Id. The outstanding
balance method, as applied by the Summers court, causes the following results:
1. If the parties fully perform as agreed, the wraparound mortgagee realizes a net gain
of $150,000 (the face amount of the wraparound mortgage ($4,500,000) less the underlying
indebtedness ($4,350,000)). Id. at 7.
2. If the mortgagor defaults and the wraparound mortgagee successfully acquires the
property with a $50,000 credit bid, then the wraparound mortgagee recovers $4,450,000 (the
difference between the face amount of the wraparound mortgage ($4,500,000) and the bid
amount ($50,000)), without any corresponding offset of the underlying debt. Id.
3. Comparing the results of #1 and #2, the wraparound mortgagee is $4,300,000 better
off ($4,450,000 recovery under #2 less $150,000 net gain under #1) if the wraparound
mortgagor defaults than if the parties fully perform under the wraparound. Id. at 8.
98. See Goren & Meyer, supra note 60, at 1052 (noting that it is unbelievable that
mortgagor would intend for mortgagee to benefit in event of default). But see Summers v.
Consolidated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. 1989) (interpreting that intent
of parties to wraparound was to obligate wraparound mortgagor to pay full outstanding
balance of wraparound); Armsey v. Channel Assocs., 184 Cal. App. 3d 833, 839, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 509, 513 (1986) (holding that wraparound mortgagor is responsible for entire balance
of wraparound and stating that court would not rewrite parties agreement); J.M. Realty
Corp. v. Stern, 296 So. 2d 588, 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (interpreting wraparound to
hold wraparound mortgagor liable for balance of wraparound). In J.M. Realty the court
refused to modify the express terms of the wraparound and stated that the court was
powerless to relieve the wraparound mortgagor from the hardships of an improvident bargain.
Id.
99. See Baggett, supra note 8, at 111 (suggesting three issues that wraparound instru-
ments should address); Waters, supra note 28, at D-10 (identifying three prominent issues
concerning wraparound foreclosure).
100. See Waters, supra note 28, at D-10 (advising that wraparound mortgagees should
consider possible usurious effect of accelerating amount due under wraparound). Usury
1990]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 47:1025
who bids at the foreclosure sale should consider the potential impact of
a wraparound mortgagor's filing of a bankruptcy petition simultaneously
with the foreclosure sale. 0 1 Third, in the event that the foreclosure sale
generates proceeds in excess of the wraparound mortgagor's debt to the
wraparound mortgagee, the foreclosing mortgagee should consider how to
apply any excess proceeds of the foreclosure sale. 0 2
Because the wraparound lender advances only part of the principal of
a wraparound in return for interest payments on the full face amount of
the wraparound, the wraparound lender receives a high yield, or rate of
return, that may violate a usury statute. 0 3 Two theories assert, however,
that a purchase money wraparound is exempt from the usury laws or,
alternatively, that the transaction is nonusurious. The first theory, the sale
exemption theory, distinguishes a loan or forbearance from a sale of real
property in which the parties use a purchase money wraparound.1 04 The
distinction between a loan or forbearance and a sale of real property is
significant because most usury statutes apply only if a loan or forbearance
exists.'0 5 Thus, if a debt such as a purchase money wraparound arose out
of a sale of property, many courts hold that the usury laws do not apply
because no loan or forbearance occurred.1 °6 Legislators justify exempting
sales of real property from the usury laws because, unlike a loan or
forbearance, a sale does not normally involve a needy borrower and an
avaricious lender.10 7
statutes vary among jurisdictions. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.73 (1988) (exempting seller
of property from usury law); compare A.iz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1201 (1987) (setting
maximum interest rate at ten percent unless different rate is contracted for in writing) with
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01 (West 1981) (making unlawful charging or receiving interest
above eight percent); see also infra notes 103-44 and accompanying text (discussing usury
implications of wraparounds).
101. See Waters, supra note 28, at D-18 (suggesting possible grounds for bankruptcy
trustee to avoid wraparound foreclosure sale); infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text
(discussing impact of Bankruptcy Code on wraparound foreclosures).
102. See Waters, supra note 28, at D-13 (discussing application of foreclosure proceeds);
infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text (same).
103. See Lowell, A Current Analysis of the Usury Laws-A National View, 8 SAN
Dmao L. REv. 193, 195 (1971) (noting that wraparound mortgagee's high yield on wrapa-
round may violate state usury laws). According to Lowell, three elements are common
among usury statutes: (1) a loan or forbearance; (2) wrongful intent; and (3) the exaction
of usurious interest. Id.; Prince George's County v. McMahon, 59 Md. App. 682, 686, 477
A.2d 1218, 1220 (1984) (explaining that wraparound lender receives effective rate of interest
higher than stated interest rate because wraparound interest rate is computed on sum of
first mortgage and additional funds advanced).
104. See Randolph, supra note 25, at 66-67 (identifying sale exemption theory's ration-
ale).
105, See Lowell, supra note 103, at 220 (stating that usury laws patterned after Statute
of Anne typically require loan or forbearance for statute to apply); Randolph, supra note
25, at 67 n.102 (explaining that usury laws do not apply to sales of property because usury
laws view mortgagor as "free-to-choose" buyer instead of "necessitous borrower").
106. See Lowell, supra note 103, at 220 (stating that many courts find that usury laws
do not apply if debt arises from purchase and sale rather that loan or forbearance).
107. See id. at 223-24 (noting that equal bargaining power is basis of excluding credit
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The second theory, the loan amount theory, focuses on the amount
of the loan. 08 One version of the loan amount theory asserts that only
the actual cash advanced constitutes the principal amount of the wrapa-
round.109 This actual cash advanced version ignores the face amount of
the wraparound because the lender did not advance the full amount of
the underlying indebtedness, an amount included in the face amount of
the wraparound, to the borrower." 0 For example, if the underlying in-
debtedness of a wraparound is $200,000 and the face amount of the
wraparound equalled $250,000, the actual cash advanced approach treats
the principal of the wraparound as $50,000 (face amount of wraparound
less underlying indebtedness). Depending on the applicable usury law, the
actual cash advanced version of the loan amount theory would label the
loan as usurious if the lender charged or received interest at a usurious
rate because the lender's total return from the wraparound is computed
on a base smaller than the face amount of the wraparound."'
The second version of the loan amount theory, the face amount
version, asserts that the full face amount of the wraparound constitutes
the principal amount of the wraparound." 2 The face amount version
assumes that the property at issue is worth at least the face amount of
sale of real property from usury laws). Lowell explains that usury laws do not encompass
sales of real property because the parties to such sales normally have equal power to
negotiate the terms of the sale, including price and interest rate. Id.
108. See Randolph supra note 25, at 68 (discussing loan amount theory); Note, The
Wrap-Around Deed of Trust, supra note 10, at 935 (same).
109. See Randolph, supra note 25, at 68 (noting that actual cash advanced version of
loan amount theory computes wraparound principal (debt) on basis of actual cash advanced).
110. See id. (noting that rationale for actual cash advanced version of loan amount
theory addresses amount of cash debtor actually, receives, not amount on which debtor
makes interest payments); supra notes 5-25 and accompanying text (discussing mechanics of
wraparounds).
111. See Randolph, supra note 25, at 68 (explaining actual cash advanced version of
loan amount theory). Randolph demonstrates how the actual cash advanced version of the
loan amount theory computes interest on a wraparound transaction in the following example:
Assume that B buys a home for $100,000, paying $10,000 in cash and executing a wraparound
for $90,000 at a 15% interest rate. Id. at 66. Further, assume that B takes the property
subject to S's existing 8% mortgage with an unpaid balance of $50,000. Id. Applying the
actual cash advanced version of the loan amount theory, the wraparound lender, S, receives
an effective annual rate of return of 23.75%, computed by adding the interest charged
(15%) on the actual cash advanced under the wraparound ($90,000 - $50,000 = $40,000)
to the difference between the interest rate S receives, 15%, and the interest rate the
wraparound lender pays on the first mortgage, 8% ((.15 - .08) x $50,000). Id. Thus, S
receives $9,500 in interest on the $40,000 S actually advanced ($6,000 interest on the $40,000
actually advanced and $3,500 interest from the difference between S's interest payment on
the first mortgage and the amount S receives from the wraparound borrower), yielding an
annual effective return of 23.75% ($9,500 divided by $40,000). Id. Under a usury statute
that prohibits the lender from receiving interest above 15%, the wraparound is usurious
because, even though the instrument states a nonusurious interest rate of 15%, the lender
actually receives interest at a rate higher than that allowed by the statute.
112. See id. at 68-69 (explaining face amount version of loan amount theory); Note,
The Wrap-Around Deed of Trust, supra note 10, at 937-40 (same).
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the wraparound." 3 The face amount approach treats the wraparound lender
as advancing both cash and credit for the unpaid balance of the underlying
indebtedness and the borrower as receiving the full economic benefit of
the face amount of the wraparound." 4 Courts, consequently, do not view
purchase money wraparounds as usurious under the face amount version
of the loan amount theory because the total return from the wraparound
is computed on the face amount of the wraparound and not the amount
of funds the lender actually advances."-
The Texas Civil Court of Appeals addressed both the sale exemption
and loan amount theories in Greenland Vistas, Inc. v. Plantation Place
Associates."6 The Greenland Vistas court specifically considered whether,
upon Plantation Place's default on a wraparound, the demand of Green-
land Vistas for the face amount of the wraparound was usurious." 7 In
Greenland Vistas Plantation Place bought an apartment complex from
Greenland Vistas, paying a portion of the purchase price in cash and
executing a purchase money wraparound for the remainder of the sale
price." 8 The face amount of the wraparound, $2,707,434, included
$2,074,830 of underlying indebtedness." 9 Greenland Vistas thus advanced
113. See Randolph, supra note 25, at 69 (noting that face amount version of loan
amount theory assumes that property's value equals or exceeds face amount of wraparound);
Note, Wrap-Around Financing, supra note 10, at 802 (same); Note, The Wrap-Around Deed
of Trust, supra note 10, at 937-38 (same); Comment, Critical Inquiry, supra note 8, at 1534-
39 (same).
114. See Randolph, supra note 25, at 69 (noting that face amount version of loan
amount theory focuses inappropriately on benefit to borrower and not on return to lender);
Comment, Critical Inquiry, supra note 8, at 1537-38 (identifying and criticizing face amount
version of loan amount theory for unrealistically equating borrower's receipt of incidents
of ownership and title to property with lender's receipt of cash in amount equal to property's
value); Note, The Wrap-Around Deed of Trust, supra note 10, at 937-38 (explaining that
face amount version of loan amount theory assumes that borrower receives full amount of
principal at outset of purchase money wraparound transaction because borrower has full
use of property that is worth face amount of wraparound); Note, Wrap-Around Financing,
supra note 10, at 802 (explaining that purchase money wraparound transaction may not be
usurious because borrower receives property with value at least equal to face amount of
wraparound).
115. See supra note 17 (illustrating results of computing interest on base larger than
amount of funds lender actually advances). An example of computing interest on a face
amount greater than funds actually advanced is as follows: Assume that B buys a home for
$100,000, paying $10,000 in cash an executing a wraparound for $90,000 at 15% interest.
Assume also that B takes the property subject to S's existing 8% mortgage with an unpaid
balance of $50,000. Applying the face amount version of the loan amount theory, the
wraparound lender, S, receives an effective annual rate of return of 15%, computed by
dividing the interest received from the wraparound ($13,500) by the face amount of the
wraparound ($90,000); supra note 111 (assuming figures to illustrate actual cash advanced
version of loan amount theory).
116. 746 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
117. Greenland Vistas, Inc. v. Plantation Place Assocs., 746 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988).




$632,604 to Plantation Place.2 0 When Plantation Place defaulted on the
wraparound, Greenland Vistas accelerated the wraparound and demanded
that Plantation Place pay the unpaid balance, plus interest, of the wrap-
around.12 1 Plantation Place sued Greenland Vistas for charging a usurious
rate of interest.1
22
The Greenland Vistas court construed the Texas usury statute 23 to
provide that a lender could violate the statute only by contracting for,
charging, or receiving interest in excess of the lawful limit.'24 Because
Plantation Place did not allege that Greenland Vistas contracted for a
usurious interest amount, the court examined only whether Greenland
Vistas' demand for payment constituted either charging or receiving interest
above the lawful limit. 25 According to the Greenland Vistas court, the
transaction at issue was a sale of real property, not a loan or forbearance.
126
The court examined the contract between the parties and found that
Greenland Vistas was obligated to pay the senior liens on the property
out of the proceeds from Plantation Place's payments on the purchase
money wraparound. 27 The court of appeals further determined that Plan-
tation Place could pay the wraparound in full and obtain the property
free of any underlying indebtedness and that Greenland Vistas could satisfy
the underlying indebtedness if Plantation Place defaulted on the wrapa-
round. 121
In making these determinations, the Greenland Vistas court reasoned
that the wraparound instruments prohibited Greenland Vistas from retain-
120. Id. In Greenland Vistas one computes the amount of cash Greenland Vistas actually
advanced, $632,604, by subtracting the unpaid balance of the underlying indebtedness
($2,074,830) from the face amount of the wraparound ($2,707,434). Id.
121. Id. In Greenland Vistas, Greenland Vistas demanded from Plantation Place a total
of $2,944,655. Id.
122. Id. at 925.
123. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1987).
124. See Greenland Vistas, 746 S.W.2d at 925 (construing Texas usury statute).
125. Id.
126. Id. The Greenland Vistas court noted that, in exchange for the wraparound,
Plantation Place, the purchaser, received a deed to the property. Id. at 926. The court
determined that Plantation Place, therefore, received the full benefit of the property and
the face amount of the note. Id. Although the Greenland Vistas court did not emphasize
the fact that the transaction was a sale of real property, one commentator asserts that the
court was distinguishing Greenland Vistas from other Texas cases that determined whether
a transaction was usurious by first subtracting any amounts of which the debtor did not
have the benefit from the face amount of the note at issue. See Waters, supra note 28, at
D-11 (explaining significance of Greenland Vistas court's noting that purchase money
wraparound transaction was sale of real property instead of loan or forbearance). Waters
explains that Texas law requires a court that tests a loan for usury to consider only the
portion of the principal balance of the loan of which the borrower receives the full benefit.
Id. Waters notes further that the court's goal is to find the "true principal" of the loan,
an amount which may be less than the face amount of the note. Id.; supra notes 104-07
and accompanying text (explaining sale exemption theory).
127. Greenland Vistas 746 S.W.2d at 926.
128. Id.
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ing the full amount of the payment demanded. 129 Greenland Vistas, instead,
could retain only the difference between the payments received from
Plantation Place and the payments required on the underlying indebted-
ness.130 By holding that Greenland Vistas was entitled to only the difference
between the payments due on the wraparound and the payments due on
the underlying indebtedness, the appellate court appeared to adopt the
actual cash advanced version of the loan amount theory and the true debt
method of wraparound debt computation.'' The court, however, went on
to hold that the outstanding balance of the wraparound comprised the
actual balance of the wraparound because Plantation Place received the
full benefit of the property and, therefore, the full benefit of the principal
amount of the wraparound.1 32 The court of appeals refused to limit the
balance of the wraparound to Plantation Place's equity in the property. 33
The Greenland Vistas court thus held that Greenland Vistas properly
demanded the principal balance of the wraparound, which included the
underlying indebtedness.
3 4
In contrast to purchase money wraparound transactions, refinancing
wraparound transactions are more likely to violate usury laws because the
total return from the wraparound is computed on a smaller principal base,
the amount of credit or cash actually advanced.1 5 In one instance, the
129. Id. The Greenland Vistas court concluded that Greenland Vistas could not retain
the full amount of the payment demanded because of the language in the wraparound
instruments. Id. at 927. The instruments, a promissory note and a deed of trust, required
Greenland Vistas to pay the senior lienholders after Greenland Vistas received Plantation
Place's payments. Id. at 926. Such language, according to the court, revealed that the parties
intended for Greenland Vistas to pay the underlying indebtedness out of Plantation Place's
monthly payments. Id. at 926-27.
130. Id. at 927.
131. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing true debt method of
wraparound debt computation); supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text (discussing actual
cash advanced version of loan amount theory).
132. Greenland Vistas, 746 S.W.2d at 927. The Greenland Vistas court implicitly adopted
the outstanding balance method of computing debt owed under a wraparound by accepting
the face amount version of the loan amount theory, which computes the principal balance
of the wraparound debt on the full face amount of the wraparound. See supra notes 112-
15 and accompanying text (discussing face amount version of loan amount theory); supra
notes 69-78 and accompanying text (discussing outstanding balance method of computing
wraparound debt). The court's holding, however, is incongruous because the court held
Plantation Place liable for the outstanding balance of the wraparound (outstanding balance
method of debt computation), yet limited Greenland Vista's right to retain the proceeds
from foreclosure to the amount of actual cash advanced (true debt method of debt
computation). Greenland Vistas, 746 S.W.2d at 927.
133. Greenland Vistas, 746 S.W.2d at 927. The Greenland Vistas court defined Plan-
tation Place's equity in the wraparound as the difference between the balance due on the
wraparound and the sums due on the underlying indebtedness. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Hool v. Rydholm, 467 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (noting
that courts often label refinancing wraparounds as usurious because courts treat only amount
advanced in addition to first mortgage as principal of wraparound on which to calculate
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Michigan Court of Appeals determined that a refinancing wraparound was
usurious under Michigan law. In Mitchell v. Trustees of United States
Mutual Real Estate Investment Trust, 36 the plaintiffs, the Mitchells, bor-
rowed $10,200 from United States Mutual and executed a $77,600 wrap-
around in favor of United States Mutual. 37 The wraparound, which
charged an eleven percent interest rate, encompassed the underlying in-
debtedness of a $64,219 first mortgage, at ten percent interest, on the
Mitchells' home.'38 The Mitchells, dissatisfied with United States Mutual's
response to the Mitchells' request for an account statement, stopped
making payments to United States Mutual on the wraparound and began
to pay the first mortgage holder directly. 139 United States Mutual declared
the wraparound in default and instituted foreclosure proceedings.' 40 After
the foreclosure sale, the Mitchells sued United States Mutual for charging
a usurious interest rate on the wraparound.'
4'
The Mitchell court determined that the effective rate of interest on
the wraparound ranged from twelve percent to twenty and one-eighth
percent, a rate well above the seven percent rate that Michigan law
allowed. 142 The Mitchell court then concluded that United States Mutual's
wraparound was usurious under the Michigan usury statute.1 43 The court,
therefore, granted the Mitchells' motion for summary judgment against
United States Mutual.14
A foreclosing wraparound mortgagee, after computing the debt of the
wraparound mortgagor, determining an appropriate bid amount, and
insuring that accelerating the wraparound will not violate a usury statute,
should consider the possibility that a bankruptcy trustee may avoid the
interest); Mindlin v. Davis, 74 So. 2d 789, 793 (Fla. 1954) (holding that courts measure
interest lender receives on refinancing wraparound against smaller base of lender's net
investment rather than larger base of face amount of wraparound); Note, Wrap-Around
Financing, supra note 10, at 797-801 (concluding that refinancing wraparounds are usurious
if refinancing lender receives interest on funds that lender did not actually advance).
136. 144 Mich. App. 302, 375 N.W.2d 424 (1985).
137. Mitchell v. Trustees of United States Mut. Real Estate Inv. Trust, 144 Mich. App.
302, 305, 375 N.W.2d 424, 426 (1985). In Mitchell the wraparound included, in addition to
the proceeds of the loan, $3,181 in fees that the Mitchells paid to United States Mutual.
Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 307, 375 N.W.2d at 427.
140. Id.
141. Mitchell, 144 Mich. App. at 307, 375 N.W.2d at 427. The Mitchell court considered
a Michigan statute that limited interest charges to seven percent per annum. See id. at 309,
375 N.W.2d at 428 (construing MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 438.31 (1978)).
142. Id. at 309 n.2, 375 N.W.2d at 428 n.2. The Mitchell court determined the rate of
interest charged by calculating the interest on the basis of the $10,200 United States Mutual
advanced to the Mitchells, rather than on $77,600, the face amount of the wraparound. Id.;
see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text (discussing actual cash advanced version of
loan amount theory for testing whether wraparound is usurious).
143. Mitchell, 144 Mich. App. at 318, 375 N.W.2d at 432.
144. Id.; see supra note 114 (criticizing face amount version of loan amount theory).
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foreclosure sale if the wraparound mortgagor commences a bankruptcy
case within ninety days to one year of the foreclosure sale.1 45 The Bank-
ruptcy Code affords the bankruptcy trustee the opportunity to avoid a
foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transfer if the wraparound mortgagor files
145. See Waters, supra note 28, at D-18 (suggesting that wraparound mortgagee, when
determining amount to bid at foreclosure sale, consider potential grounds for setting aside
foreclosure sale).
For example, if the wraparound mortgagor files a bankruptcy petition within 90 days
after the foreclosure sale, the bankruptcy trustee may avoid the foreclosure sale as a
preferential transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988) (providing grounds for bankruptcy trustee
to avoid foreclosure sale as preferential transfer). Under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code, a bankruptcy trustee may avoid, as a preference, a transfer of the debtor's property
if the property is transferred: (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on account
of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3) while the
debtor was insolvent; (4) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
and (5) so as to enable the creditor to receive more than the creditor would receive if the
case were a chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Id.; see also Park North Partners, Ltd. v. Park
North Associates, 80 Bankr. 551, 554-55 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987) (illustrating bankruptcy
trustee's ability to avoid wraparound foreclosure sale as preferential transfer); Smith v.
American Consumer Fin. Corp., 21 Bankr. 345, 350 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (setting aside
foreclosure sale as preferential transfer).
In Park North Partners, Ltd. v. Park North Associates, 80 Bankr. 551, 551 (Bankr.
D. Ga. 1987) the district court reviewed a bankruptcy court's holding that a wraparound
foreclosure sale did not operate as a preferential transfer. Three months after Park North
Associates (Associates), the wraparound mortgagee, foreclosed upon and used a credit bid
to purchase property at a foreclosure sale, Park North Partners (Partners), the wraparound
mortgagor, filed a petition for bankruptcy and subsequently sued Associates, claiming that
the foreclosure sale resulted in a preferential transfer to Associates. Park North Partners,
Ltd. v. Park North Assocs., 72 Bankr. 79, 80-81 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987). The bankruptcy
court held that Partners failed to prove that Associates, as a creditor, received a preferential
transfer. Id.
On appeal the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
recognized that a debtor's payment to a secured creditor, to the extent of the value of the
secured creditor's claim, does not constitute a preferential transfer. Park North Partners,
Ltd. v. Park North Assocs., 80 Bankr. 551, 551 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987). The district court
stated, however, that a foreclosure sale could constitute a preferential transfer if the secured
creditor received more from the foreclosure that the creditor would have received in a
Chapter 7 liquidation, which would not exceed the value of the creditor's claim. Id. at 554.
The court thus held that, if a secured creditor at foreclosure received property valued in
excess of the amount of the creditor's claim, the foreclosure sale constitutes a preferential
transfer. Id. at 554-55. The district court, consequently, vacated the bankruptcy court's
order and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to determine the fair market value of
the property at the time Partners filed the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 555.
On remand the bankruptcy court found that the fair market value of the property at
the time Partners filed the bankruptcy petition was $1,050,000. Park North Partners, Ltd.
v. Park North Assocs., 85 Bankr. 916, 919 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). Because Associates
received more from the foreclosure sale (property valued at $1,050,000) than Associates
would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation ($857,210), the bankruptcy court found that
the foreclosure sale constituted a preferential transfer. Id. The bankruptcy court, pursuant
to section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1988), awarded Partners a money
judgment totaling $192,790, which represented the difference between the fair market value
of the property and the balance of the wraparound. Id.
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a bankruptcy petition within twelve months after the foreclosure sale. 146
Bankruptcy trustees rely on the Bankruptcy Code, which requires that the
wraparound mortgagor receive a reasonably equivalent value of the prop-
erty from the foreclosure sale, to avoid a foreclosure sale as a fraudulent
transfer. 147 One court has interpreted "reasonably equivalent value" to
require that a debtor receive at least seventy percent of the fair market
value of the property at foreclosure. 14 Courts, by treating the amount of
the underlying indebtedness differently, have arrived at different figures
for "reasonably equivalent value," and have yet to agree on the treatment
of underlying indebtedness. 149
146. See II U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988) (empowering bankruptcy trustee to avoid foreclo-
sure sale as fraudulent transfer). Under section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy
trustee may set aside a transfer of property if: (1) the debtor had an interest in the property
transferred; (2) the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as
a result of the transfer; (3) the transfer occurred within one year of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition; and (4) the transfer was for less than a "reasonably equivalent value."
Id. See also Becker value." Id.; see also Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-27
(suggesting that wraparound mortgagee should consider effect of Bankruptcy Code's fraud-
ulent transfer section when wraparound mortgagee determines bid price at foreclosure sale);
Waters, supra note 28, at D-18 (same).
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988) (empowering bankruptcy trustee to avoid
wraparound foreclosure as fraudulent transfer if debtor receives less than reasonably equiv-
alent value in exchange for transfer); Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-27 (suggesting
that reasonably equivalent value requirement of Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer
provision presents ground for trustee to avoid foreclosure sale); Waters, supra note 28, at
D-18 (same).
148. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980)
(noting that no previous court had approved transfer of debtor's property for less than
seventy percent of market value of property). Courts have generally interpreted Durrett as
announcing that courts should view reasonably equivalent value in the foreclosure context
as 70% of the fair market value of the property. See Bundles v. Baker, 856 F.2d 815, 819-
20 (7th Cir. 1988) (analyzing Durrett definition of reasonably equivalent value and noting
courts' and commentators' interpretation of Durrett). According to two commentators, most
courts are now interpreting the seventy percent standard only as a general guideline. See
Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-17 (explaining that recent cases indicate that courts
do not rigidly apply Durrett seventy percent standard); Walker v. Littleton, 888 F.2d 90,
93 (lth Cir. 1989) (stating that Durrett seventy percent rule provides useful guideline to
evaluate fairness of transfer); Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823-24 (stating that courts should not
limit definition of reasonably equivalent value to percentage comparison but should consider
all facts of each case).
149. See Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-28 - H-32 (discussing different effects
of recognizing underlying indebtedness in computing reasonably equivalent value); Waters,
supra note 28, at D-20 to D-24 (same). Courts have recognized four ways of treating the
underlying indebtedness when deciding whether the debtor received a reasonably equivalent
value from a foreclosure sale. See Willis v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 48 Bankr. 295,
301 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (summarizing four approaches courts use in determining
reasonably equivalent value when foreclosure does not affect underlying indebtedness).
The first approach ignores the underlying indebtedness on the property and divides the
foreclosure sale price by the fair market value of the property to determine the reasonably
equivalent value. See Smith v. American Consumer Fin. Corp., 21 Bankr. 345, 351 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1982) (comparing foreclosure sales price to fair market value of property). The
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In addition to avoiding usury claims, determining bid amounts, and
considering the impact of the Bankruptcy Code on wraparound foreclo-
Smith approach equation for computing reasonably equivalent value is as follows:
Foreclosure Sale Price (Bid) = Reasonably
Fair Market Value Equivalent Value %
See Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-28 (explaining Smith approach to compute
reasonably equivalent value); Waters, supra note 28, at D-20 (same). Commentators and
courts have criticized the Smith approach for ignoring the underlying indebtedness and the
economic reality of the transaction. See In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434, 442 n.l1 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1982) (criticizing Smith approach for failing to credit successful bidder for first
lien indebtedness because purchaser at junior lien foreclosure takes property subject to first
lien indebtedness); Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-28 (same); Waters, supra note
28, at D-20 (same).
The second approach recognizes the underlying indebtedness on the property by adding
the amount of underlying indebtedness to the foreclosure sale price and then dividing the
resulting sum by the fair market value of the property. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v.
Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 426 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197
(9th Cir. 1984) (adding underlying indebtedness to foreclosure sale price and then comparing
sum to fair market value of foreclosed property). The Madrid approach equates reasonably
equivalent value as follows:
Underlying Indebtedness + Foreclosure Sale Price Reasonably
Fair Market Value Equivalent Value Oo
See Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-28 to H-29 (illustrating Madrid approach);
Waters, supra note 28, at D-20 (same). The Madrid approach has been criticized for giving
credit to the junior lien purchaser for an amount that the purchaser is not legally obligated
to pay (the senior indebtedness) because the purchaser takes the property subject to the
senior liens. See Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 442 n.lI (criticizing Madrid approach to calculating
reasonably equivalent value). Additionally, from the bankruptcy debtor's perspective, the
Madrid approach fails to recognize that the debtor remains obligated for an amount that
includes the underlying indebtedness if the outstanding balance method is adopted. See id.
(same).
The third approach compares the foreclosure sale price to the debtor's equity remaining
in the property after subtracting the amount of presale liens from the value of the property.
See Coleman v. Home Savings Assoc., 21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982)
(computing reasonably equivalent value by dividing debtor's equity in property by foreclosure
sale price). The Coleman equation for reasonably equivalent value is as follows:
Foreclosure Sale Price _ Reasonably
Fair Market Value - All Encumbrances Equivalent Value o
See Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-29 (explaining Coleman approach); Waters,
supra note 28, at D-21 (same). The Coleman approach is criticized for giving double credit
to the amount of the foreclosure bid: the Coleman approach subtracts all preforeclosure
liens, including the lien being foreclosed upon, from the fair market value of the property
and then uses the foreclosure bid as a comparison figure to reach the reasonably equivalent
value percentage. See Richardson, 21 Bankr. at 441-42 n.11 (criticizing Coleman approach
for giving double credit to foreclosure bid); Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-29
(same); Waters, supra note 28, at D-21 (same).
The final approach compares the foreclosure bid to the debtor's equity remaining in
the property after subtracting the postsale liens from the value of the property. See
Richardson, 21 Bankr. at 441 (comparing foreclosure bid amount to debtor's equity in
property after subtracting senior liens from fair market value). The Richardson reasonably
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sures, the parties to a wraparound should determine how to proceed in
the event that the successful bidder incorrectly calculates the debt owed
on the wraparound. 150 In such an instance two results are possible: excess
equivalent value equation is as follows:
Foreclosure Bid Amount Reasonably
Fair Market Value - Senior Liens Equivalent Value %
See Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-30 (explaining Richardson computation of
reasonably equivalent value); Waters, supra note 28, at D-22 (same). Commentators criticize
the Richardson approach for crediting the debtor with too much equity because the Richard-
son approach calculates reasonably equivalent value as if no senior lien encumbered the
property. See Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-30 (criticizing Richardson approach
for ignoring senior lien); Waters, supra note 28, at D-22 (same).
Becker and Bingham suggest that the Richardson approach also ignores that a purchaser
at a foreclosure sale, while not legally obligated to satisfy the senior lien, would not have
purchased the property unless the purchaser intended to satisfy the senior lien. See Becker
& Bingham, supra note 87, at H-30 (criticizing Richardson approach). Commentators also
suggest that the Richardson approach requires the junior lienholder who purchases the
property at the foreclosure sale to pay more than seventy percent of the fair market value
of the property to assure that the debtor receives a reasonably equivalent value from the
sale. See id. (explaining that Richardson approach requires junior lienholder to bid amount
exceeding 70% of fair market value); Waters, supra note 28, at D-22 (same). Becker and
Bingham offer the following example: Assume that the fair market value of the property is
$100, encumbered by a first lien in the amount of $50 and a second lien in the amount of
$20. Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at H-30. The debtor's equity in the property is $30.
Id. To assure that the debtor receives 70% of the fair market value, the second lien purchaser
under the Richardson formula would have to bid $35 (70% of $50 [the postsale senior lien]).
Id. If the junior lienholder bids $35 and also accommodates the first lien of $50, the junior
lienholder has paid $85 for property worth $100, when only $70 would be required to meet
the most demanding reasonably equivalent value interpretation. See id. (explaining that
Durrett only requires 70% of fair market value for debtor to receive reasonably equivalent
value).
According to three leading commentators on junior lien foreclosure, most courts appear
to be adopting the Richardson approach in determining whether a debtor received a
reasonably equivalent value at a foreclosure sale. See Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at
H-31 (noting trend of courts adopting Richardson approach); Waters, supra note 28, at D-
23 (same). Becker and Bingham argue, however, that the Madrid approach is the correct
approach to use when determining whether a debtor received a reasonably equivalent value
from a foreclosure sale under the 70% standard. See Becker & Bingham, supra note 87, at
H-32 (stating that Madrid approach is only approach "true to the guidelines of Durrett").
Becker and Bingham suggest that the Madrid approach encourages third party bidding by
allowing junior lienholders to include the full amount of the senior lien in their bids. See
id. (suggesting that Madrid approach is only approach that encourages third party bidding).
Waters, likewise, agrees that the Madrid approach is the correct approach to determining
the question of reasonably equivalent value. See Waters, supra note 28, at D-24 (stating
that Madrid approach is correct test to determine if debtor received reasonably equivalent
value based on Durrett). Waters argues that the Madrid approach more closely follows the
Durrett requirements because the Madrid approach uses the fair market value of the property
as the benchmark. See id. (advocating Madrid approach to determine reasonably equivalent
value). In addition, the Madrid approach recognizes the economic reality that a junior
lienholder will protect the junior lienholder's interest in the property by meeting the first
lien obligation. See id. (same).
150. See Waters, supra note 28, at D-10 (suggesting that wraparound mortgagees
consider application of foreclosure sale proceeds).
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proceeds are generated' or a deficiency results . 5 2 Although the priority
of liens on the property should direct the application of any excess
proceeds, the law with respect to lien priority in wraparound transactions
is complex, uncertain, and inconsistent.5 3 The sparse case law that ad-
dresses wraparound financing has yet to clarify the issue of lien priority.1
4
In deciding who should receive the proceeds from a foreclosure sale, courts
should examine the wraparound instruments connected with the foreclosed
property. 5  If the wraparound instruments fail to address foreclosure
procedures, then the court should imply an agreement that is consistent
with the parties' expressed intent.
56
Despite an express foreclosure provision in the wraparound documents,
the Texas Supreme Court in Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special
Trust implied a covenant that directed the trustee to apply excess proceeds
from a foreclosure "upstream": to senior lienholders, then to junior
lienholders, and, finally, to the defaulting wraparound mortgagor. 57 The
Summers decision is inconsistent with the traditional view that the fore-
closure of a junior lien, such as a wraparound, does not affect senior
mortgages, which still encumber the property. 5 One commentator argues
that a more sound approach would apply any excess proceeds from the
wraparound foreclosure to junior lienholders and then to the defaulting
mortgagor, ignoring the senior lienholders. 5 9 In addition to protecting
senior lienholders by requiring the upstream payment of proceeds, the
Summers court's pro-senior lienholder decision militates against most
foreclosure notice statutes, which generally do not require that foreclosing
151. See id. (explaining that excess proceeds result when foreclosure sale price exceeds
amount of debt that wraparound mortgagor owes wraparound mortgagee).
152. See supra note 52 (explaining that deficiency results when foreclosure sale price is
less than amount of debt that wraparound mortgagor owed wraparound mortgagee).
153. See Gunning, supra note 2, at 46 (noting lack of unanimity of lien priority law);
Galowitz, supra note 1, at 122 (discussing lien priority of wraparounds).
154. See Waters, supra note 28, at D-19 (noting that cases involving lien priority in
wraparounds confuse more than clarify lien priority law).
155. See Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex.
1989) (stating that courts should examine written contract and should imply covenant for
application of foreclosure proceeds only when express contract is silent); cf. Armsey v.
Channel Assocs., 184 Cal. App. 3d 833, 838, 229 Cal. Rptr. 509, 512 (1986) (noting that
parties can and should address foreclosure procedures in wraparound documents, including
how foreclosure proceeds should be applied).
156. See Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 490, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635
(1941) (stating that courts should imply covenants when necessary to give effect to actual
intention of parties as reflected in contract).
157. See Summers, 783 S.W.2d at 583 (discussing application of excess proceeds from
wraparound foreclosure).
158. See generally, Baggett, supra note 8, at 114 (stating that foreclosure of junior liens
does not affect senior liens); Waters, supra note 28, at D-7 (same).
159. See Baggett, supra note 8, at 114 (suggesting that trustee should apply excess
proceeds to inferior lienholders and subsequently to defaulting wraparound mortgagor
because foreclosure of junior lien should not affect senior liens).
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junior lienholders notify senior lienholders of a foreclosure. 160 By protect-
ing a senior lienholder from the foreclosure of a junior lien of which the
senior lienholder would not have notice, the Summers court decision is an
anomaly. 161 Courts following the Summers directive to pay senior lien-
holders when the wraparound documents do not contemplate the appli-
cation of foreclosure proceeds still must decide which senior lienholder to
pay first. Courts either could pay the most senior lienholder first and then
distribute proceeds "downstream" or could pay the most junior of the
senior lienholders first and progress vertically because the more senior
lienholders are better protected by their own foreclosure remedies. 62 The
Summers decision is devoid of guidance on which distribution scheme
courts should follow.
Given the lack of judicial guidance on the foreclosure of wraparounds,
parties to wraparound agreements carefully should draft all wraparound
provisions, particularly the foreclosure provisions. 63 Attorneys should
advise parties to a wraparound of the possible distressing results of a
wraparound foreclosure.' 64 First, the attorney should examine the wrapa-
round transaction under the applicable usury law.165 Second, before ad-
vising a wraparound mortgagee of what amount to bid at foreclosure, the
wraparound mortgagee's attorney should determine the wraparound mort-
160. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT § 1-339.54 (1983) (requiring that trustee notify only
judgment debtor of foreclosure); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (Vernon 1984) (requiring
that trustee notify only parties obligated to pay debt on property that is subject of
foreclosure); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.1 (1986) (requiring that trustee notify only present
owner of property to be sold at foreclosure).
161. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (illustrating that protecting senior
lienholder from foreclosure which does not affect and of which the senior lienholder is not
required to be notified is anomolous).
162. See J. Wimsr & R. SnmmRs, UmirroP CoMRCIAL CODE § 24-4, at 1131, § 24-
5, at 1138 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing various lien priority schemes).
163. See Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W.2d 580, 584 (Mauzy,
J., dissenting) (discussing legal uncertainty surrounding wraparound financing). Justice
Mauzy, in his dissenting opinion in Summers, suggests that the best way to avoid the risk
of judicial uncertainty about wraparounds is to take Polonius's advice to Laertes, "neither
a borrower nor a lender be." Id. at 584 n.1 (citing W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of
Denmark Act I, Scene III). Justice Mauzy also suggests that a more feasible way of avoiding
the risk of wraparounds is for borrowers to use safer, more conventional means of financing.
Summers, 783 S.W.2d 580, 584 n.1 (Tex. 1989) (Mauzy, J., dissenting); see also Armsey v.
Channel Assocs., 184 Cal. App. 3d 833, 838, 229 Cal. Rptr. 509, 513 (suggesting that
parties to wraparounds include proper procedures for declaring default and conducting
foreclosure).
164. See Goren & Meyer, supra note 60, at 1052 (cautioning that attorneys advise
wraparound clients carefully on foreclosure matters). Goren and Meyer note that at least
one attorney has been sued for malpractice by a wraparound mortgagor. Id. The attorney
advised the wraparound mortgagor to bid an amount at the foreclosure sale that exceeded
the true debt of the wraparound. Id. The wraparound mortgagor later claimed that the
foreclosure sale generated excess proceeds and sued the wraparound mortgagee, who sub-
sequently sued the attorney for malpractice. Id.
165. See supra notes 103-44 and accompanying text (discussing usury implications of
wraparounds).
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gagor's debt. 166 Third, attorneys should consider the possible grounds on
which a wraparound mortgagee may have a foreclosure sale set aside. The
attorney should recognize that a wraparound mortgagor who files a bank-
ruptcy petition might adversely affect the foreclosure sale. 16 7 Finally,
assuming that the foreclosure sale generates excess proceeds, the attorney
must advise the client on the proper application of the proceeds.
68
Recognizing that parties can structure a wraparound transaction in a
myriad of ways, the following suggestions demonstrate how parties to a
wraparound might avoid some of the common foreclosure problems, such
as debt computation, bidding at a foreclosure sale, and application of
excess foreclosure proceeds. 69 In the instruments that embody a wrapa-
round transaction,170 the drafters should address the following foreclosure
issues:'17
I. GENERAL FORECLOSURE PROVISIONS
172
A. The wraparound includes the underlying liens.
B. The wraparound mortgagee will pay the underlying indebtedness
from the wraparound mortgagor's payments on the wraparound.
166. See supra notes 53-98 and accompanying text (discussing outstanding balance and
true debt methods of wraparound debt computation). If the jurisdiction follows the out-
standing balance method, then the attorney can ignore the underlying indebtedness for the
purpose of determining the amount owed under the wraparound. See supra notes 72-78 and
accompanying text (discussing outstanding balance method of wraparound debt computa-
tion). If the jurisdiction follows the true debt method, the attorney should subtract the
balance of the underlying indebtedness from the balance of the wraparound to determine
the amount that the wraparound mortgagor owes the wraparound mortgagee. See supra
notes 53-65 and accompanying text (discussing true debt method of wraparound debt
computation). The conservative approach to determining the wraparound mortgagee's bid
amount at foreclosure is the true debt method. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-60 (advising
that conservative approach would have wraparound mortgagee bid only true debt at fore-
closure sale); Goren & Meyer, supra note 60, at 1052 (advising conservative wraparound
mortgagee to bid true debt to avoid creating excess proceeds).
167. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (discussing provisions in Bankruptcy
Code that allow courts to avoid foreclosure sales).
168. See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text (discussing application of excess
proceeds).
169. See supra notes 53-98 and accompanying text (discussing computation of wrapa-
round debt and bidding at foreclosures); supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing application of foreclosure sale proceeds).
170. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing wraparound instruments: the
mortgage or deed of trust and the promissory note).
171. But see Comment, Critical Inquiry, supra note 8, at 1565 (concluding that even
careful drafting of wraparound agreements may not alter judicial interpretation of legal
effect of wraparounds).
172. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-12 (suggesting general provisions that drafters
should include in wraparound instruments). Bentley states that, when a wraparound trans-
action involves a series of prior notes which themselves are wraparounds, the parties should
include a provision that addresses whether the mortgagee is obligated to pay all of the prior
notes, wraparound and otherwise, or only the preceding wraparound. Id. Bentley suggests
that the wraparound documents should contain a usury savings clause that disclaims that
the lender intends to collect a usurious rate of interest. Id.
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C. The wraparound mortgagor will make payments on the wrapa-
round prior to the date payments are due on the underlying indebtedness,
and the wraparound mortgagee will notify the wraparound mortgagor
when the wraparound mortgagee has made payments on the underlying
indebtedness.
D. When the balance of the wraparound equals the principal balance
of the underlying indebtedness, the wraparound mortgagor will be consid-
ered to have paid the wraparound in full and will be entitled to a full
release of the lien securing the wraparound's payment.
17
1
E. A default in the payment on the underlying notes or liens securing
the wraparound payment does not constitute a default on the wraparound
itself unless the holder of the underlying notes or liens declares a default.174
F. The mortgagee is obligated to pay all of the prior notes, wrapa-
round and otherwise, or, alternatively, that the mortgagee is obligated to
pay only the preceding wraparound.
G. Upon foreclosure, the property will be sold subject to the under-
lying indebtedness.
75
II. COMPUTING DEBT PROVISION
Defining the procedure for declaring a default, including what sum
will represent the principal amount of the wraparound due upon default. 7 6
173. See id. at X-13 (suggesting that wraparound mortgagor deal directly with holders
of underlying notes by using provision that releases wraparound mortgagor from liens on
wraparound once wraparound mortgagor reduces balance of wraparound to amount equal
to balance of underlying indebtedness).
174. But see R. KRATOVI & R. WERNER, supra note 7, at 380 (suggesting that most
important wraparound clause is cross default provision). Kratovil and Werner explain that
a cross- default clause states that a default on the first mortgage constitutes a default on
the wraparound. Id. Kratovil and Werner recommend a cross-default clause to protect the
wraparound mortgagee from the borrower agreeing with the first mortgage holder that the
borrower will make payments on the first lien and default on the wraparound. Id.
175. One leading commentator on wraparound foreclosures suggests that the following
general provisions be included in the deed of trust:
It is stipulated and agreed that the lien created by this instrument is secondary
and inferior to the lien securing the unpaid balance of that certain $
indebtedness described in and secured by a Deed of Trust of record in Volume
- , Pages .. of the Deed of Trust Records of - County, [ State ], which
indebtedness the Grantors herein have not assumed, but which the Beneficiary
herein is obligated to pay as and when due, as provided in the hereinbefore
mentioned Deed, and in the event said Beneficiary falls to pay when due any
installment or installments falling due thereon, then, so long as Grantors herein
are not in default in the payment of the Note hereby secured, or in default in the
performance of the covenants of this Deed of Trust, Grantors herein shall have
the right to pay any such delinquent installment or installments and receive credit
upon the Note hereby secured for all sums so paid, and in such manner as Grantors
may direct, as of the date of such payment.
Bentley, supra note 2, at X-28 to X-29.
176. In light of Summers v. Consolidated Capital Special Trust, 783 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.
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III. BID AMOUNT AT FORECLOSURE PROVISIONS
A. Limiting the foreclosing wraparound mortgagee's credit bid at
foreclosure by stating that the mortgagee can enter a credit bid only in
an amount equal to the difference between the unpaid underlying
indebtedness and the unpaid wraparound balance. 17 7 This provision would
provide further that any bid over that difference would require cash.
B. The purchaser at foreclosure is purchasing only the wraparound
mortgagee's equity in the property, the equity being equal to the amount
of the defaulted debt.
7 8
C. By crediting the purchaser's purchase price in the amount of the
underlying indebtedness, the purchaser takes the property "subject to"
the underlying liens. In other words, the parties would agree that the
purchaser may pay for the property partly in cash and partly by taking
the property "subject to" the underlying liens.
1 79
D. If the parties did not agree that the principal balance of the
wraparound upon foreclosure would be the true debt of the wraparound,
then the parties would designate that the total amount of the bid is a
credit against the balance of the wraparound being foreclosed.8 0 For
example:
It is stipulated and agreed that the purchaser of the Mortgaged
Premises at a public sale is to be considered as having taken the
underlying indebtedness into account in making a bid. The pur-
chaser's bid shall be composed of cash, recognizing Mortgagee's
equity in the property, and of additional consideration in the
1989) and Lee v. Key West Towers, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1989), a provision defining
the principal amount due under the wraparound upon default is crucial if the parties to the
wraparound do not intend for the outstanding balance method of debt computation to
apply. Absent such an express provision, a court could rely on Summers and Lee to use the
outstanding balance method and hold that the entire outstanding balance of the wraparound
is due. The parties expressly may agree, however, that the true debt method applies to
permit the mortgagee to pay the wraparound in full by paying the difference between the
balance of the wraparound and the unpaid underlying indebtedness. A sample true debt
clause in a deed of trust is the following:
It is stipulated and agreed that in the event of default on the lien created by this
instrument, payment of the "principal balance" means payment of the difference
between the balance of the lien created by this instrument and the balances of the
Prior Mortgage Documents; and NOT the balance of the lien created by this
instrument.
177. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (discussing cash bid requirement).
178. See FPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E & G Invs., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 1023, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 157, 161 (1989) (suggesting that wraparound instruments provide that amount in
default at foreclosure sale be limited to wraparound mortgagee's equity).
179. See Bentley, supra note 2, at X-61 (explaining how parties agree to allow purchaser
to make net bid on property by paying some of bid in cash and by taking property subject
to underlying indebtedness).
180. See id. (suggesting how parties can agree to use true debt method of debt
computation in structuring wraparound).
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amount of the underlying indebtedness, recognizing purchaser's
acceptance of the Mortgaged Premises subject to the Prior Mort-
gage Documents.
IV. APPLICATION OF FORECLOSURE SALE PROCEEDS
PROVISIONS
A. Defining the formula, either true debt method or outstanding
balance method, for determining whether a deficiency or excess proceeds
exist upon foreclosure of a wraparound.
B. A distribution scheme that distributes excess proceeds first to any




C. Prohibiting the wraparound mortgagee from seeking a deficiency
judgment against the wraparound mortgagor or the wraparound mortga-
gor's successors or assigns. Alternatively, the wraparound mortgagor should
limit a wraparound mortgagee's remedy for a deficiency to the true debt
of the wraparound: the difference between the balance of the wraparound
and the unpaid underlying indebtedness.
BILL B. CARAWAY
181. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing one distribution scheme for
distributing excess proceeds).
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